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STRATEGI UNTUK MENGHALANG KEMUNCULAN PENGGANAS 
DALAM NEGERI DI GHANA 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Selepas serangan 11 September 2001, ancaman ‘home-grown’ (home-grown 
terrorism) (HGT) wujud sebagai satu bentuk keganasan yang menimbulkan satu 
ancaman baru kepada semua negara di Eropah, Amerika, Asia dan Afrika. Sejak 
kebelakangan ini, HGT telah mengorbankan ramai nyawa individu dan ini menjadi 
satu ancaman berat yang perlu dihadapi oleh individu di seluruh dunia kerana 
menjejaskan keselamatan dan kesejahteraan kehidupan individu yang menjalani 
kehidupan yang aman dan mampan di negara maju dan negara sedang membangun. 
Oleh itu, kajian ini ingin meneliti sifat HGT di Ghana dengan menilai strategi- 
strategi yang digunakan oleh aktor kerajaan dan aktor bukan kerajaan untuk 
mengatasinya dengan menggunakan kerangka Keamanan Manusia (Human Security) 
untuk memahami strategi-strategi yang diguna pakai di Ghana bagi mengelakkan 
kemasukan HGT dalam kawasan Afrika Barat yang tidak stabil seperti negara Ivory 
Coast, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali dan Nigeria yang tengah menghadapi HGT. Kajian 
ini menggunakan kaedah temu bual mendalam untuk mendapatkan maklmuat daripda 
tiga agensi keselamatan negeri dan 10 orang imam daripada 10 wilayah di seluruh 
Ghana. Penemuan daripada aktor kerajaan mendapati bahawa tentera ISIS Ghana 
yang telah kembali pengancam utama yang menyebabkan HGT berlaku di Ghana. 
Aktor bukan kerajaan mempercayai bahawa kuasa ISIS untuk merekrut belia Ghana, 
radikalisasi agama, pengangguran belia yang tinggi dan ketidakstabilan serantau 
adalah ancaman HGT di Ghana. Aktor kerajaan mampu menggagalkan HGT di 
Ghana dengan: tadbir urus yang baik, memantau dakwah Islam, pendidikan awam, 
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meningkatkan kerjasama antarabangsa, menubuhkan pusat pemulihan, mewujudkan 
operasi ketenangan dan memantau aktiviti kewangan oleh individu dan korporat. 
Pendekatan aktor bukan kerajaan Ghana dalam mengatasi HGT pula berbeza. 
Mereka menggunakan kaedah baru untuk mengajar, melibatkan belia dalam pelbagai 
aktiviti dan memberi pendedahan berkenaan HGT. Kajian ini merumuskan bahawa, 
langkah untuk mencegah HGT di Ghana oleh pihak aktor kerajaan dan aktor bukan 
kerajaan ialah berdasarkan masa strategi melawan ancaman yang tepat. Akhirnya, 
kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa kerajaan perlu mengadakan program nasional 
secara rasmi untuk memerangi HGT. Polisi dokumen program tersebut perlu terdiri 
daripada pengawasan radikalisasi agama oleh agensi kerajaan atau pemerintah. 
xv  
STRATEGIES TO PREVENT HOME-GROWN TERRORISM IN GHANA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, home-grown terrorism (HGT) 
emerged with significant threat to all nations across Europe, America, Asia and 
Africa. In recent years, HGT has caused the death of many people and is gravely 
threatening humanity across the world, affecting human security, well-being and 
peaceful state of many individuals living in both developed and developing nations. 
Therefore, this study explored the nature of HGT in Ghana by assessing the  
strategies used by state and non-state actors to counter it by adopting the Human 
Security frameworks to understand the strategies adopted by Ghana to prevent HGT 
in an unstable West African region, where countries like: Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, 
Niger, Mali and Nigeria, have all suffered from HGT. The study used in-depth 
interview to elicit qualitative data from three state security agencies and ten Islamic 
religious leaders (Imams) from Ghana’s ten regions. The findings from state actors 
revealed that: Ghanaian ISIS returnees are the sole threat that can cause HGT in 
Ghana. Non-state actors believed that, ISIS power of recruiting Ghanaian youth, 
religious radicalization, high youth unemployment and the regional instability are the 
threats of HGT in Ghana. State actors were able to thwart HGT in Ghana with: good 
governance, monitoring Islamic preaching, public education, increased international 
cooperation, establishing rehabilitation centers, creating stillness operation and 
monitoring financial activities by individuals and corporations. Ghanaian non-state 
actors’ approach in countering HGT was different: They adopted new methods of 
preaching, engaged the youth in their various activities and preached against HGT. 
The study concluded that, the move to prevent HGT in Ghana by state and non-state 
xvi  
actors is a timely and significant counter-terrorism strategy. Finally, the study 
recommends that, the state should put in place a nationwide program to fight HGT. 
The policy document of such program should comprise supervision of religious 
process of radicalization by a government agency or commission. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Overview 
 
Home-grown terrorism (HGT) is the most extraordinary disparaging conflict 
and a form of modern terrorism in the twenty-first century. After the September 11, 
2001 attacks, some radical and extreme local residents in America, Australia, 
Europe, Asia and Africa conceptualized and planned deadly attacks against their 
country of birth while building up the so-called Islamic State (IS) or other terrorist 
groups as their ideological orientations (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). 
It has assumed by many security analysts that; the terrorist threats have 
gradually become more of home grown nature. The analysts argue that, as the attack 
on the Al Qaeda organization has divided the group, small sector of the terrorists and 
unreachable persons getting little more than momentum from abroad have become 
the primary concern (Cato Institute, 2012). 
However, cases of home-grown extremism have increased over the past 
years, posing a growing threat to many nations across the globe. According to a new 
United States (US) Homeland Security Committee Report (2017); America has 
witnessed thirty-nine HGT attacks across 20 federal states over one-year period, 
scoring an eight percent raise from March 2017. The inclination also grew drastically 
in the year 2016. 
According to Johnson (2017), more than 20 percent of the 209 home-grown 
extremist cases in the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks have 
taken place over the past 12 months. He explained that, 60 percent of those cases 
involved connected to the extremist Islamic State terrorist group. In Europe’s case, a 
number of European countries continue to face an unrelenting threat from home- 
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grown terrorists. The threat has amplified with the increased activities of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the Al-Qaeda derivative even though they have  
now lost control over many cities they used to operate in Libya, Iraq and Syria. 
These security anxieties are being aggravated by extraordinary ranks of 
resettlement into Europe from poor and/or war-torn quarters of the Middle East, 
Africa, and the Balkans, with ISIS predicting such directions for penetration 
(Simcox, 2016). 
Thus, Europeans encounter a greater risk from HGT than people in the United 
States because they are essentially nearer to Libya and Iraq and the Muslim 
population in Europe frequently suffers and feels further isolated from society than 
their Muslim brothers in the United States (Strickler, 2015). 
Similarly, Southeast Asia has long been a fruitful place for the increase of 
Islamic terror networks. Various international extremist groups have had a continued 
presence in Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries, including 
the Jemaah Islamiyah ( اإلاسلمية  اجلامعة ), Al Qaeda and now ISIS (Lowe, 2017). 
 
In Africa, the continent has become ever more exposed to the activities of 
terrorist groups and this has become a growing concern to the global community. 
Right from Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria to Somali Al-Shabaab, from well- 
known Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), to the Islamic Fighting Group in 
Libya, the growing intimidation from the arc of home-grown terror have turned out 
to be a pestilence for the African continent (Sun, 2014). 
According to U.S (United States) Department of State country report on 
HGT, Africa experienced momentous level of HGT movement in 2015. In East 
Africa, where terrorist groups have been very active, Al-Shabaab a Somalia-based 
terrorist group demonstrated its power of endurance and re-emerged from a sequence 
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of most important slow down experienced in the early part of 2015, which included 
the death of main functions and the defeat of monopolies and secure shelter in parts 
of south-central Somalia. In spite of these setbacks, the African Union mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) fight back to counter Al-Shabaab, as the terrorist group 
implemented more and more violent strategies (U.S. Department of State, 2015). 
So far, in the West African Region, Ghana enjoys a pleasant status for being 
moderately non-violent, safe and sound in the sub-region, although HGT has 
drastically affected other West African states, particularly in radiance of the 
divergence in Niger, Mali and the advance of terrorist aggression in northern Nigeria. 
According to Burchard (2016), Boko Haram’s insurgency in Nigeria and its growth 
to other countries in the Lake Chad Basin since January 2016, has witnessed two 
foremost terrorist attacks that have essentially traumatized the security landscape in 
West Africa, emphasizing HGT as a mounting threat to the region. 
However, in January 2016, unknown gunmen stormed the Splendid Hotel in 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, a country that shares border with Ghana, taking 
hostages and holding the hotel for several hours. Security forces in Burkina Faso 
were ultimately talented to successfully free hundreds of hostages, but after 29 lost 
their lives and approximately 50 injured in the attack. 
In addition, in early March 2016, a similar attack took place in the  resort 
town of Grand-Bassam in Ivory Coast, also a neighboring country to Ghana, where 
unidentified attackers stormed three separate hotels, killing approximately 20 and 
injuring scores of others. Even though Ghana has not witnessed any terrorist attack, 
its comparative stability should not be taken for granted as the country faces 
numerous threats of HGT. 
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In the view that HGT seems to pose serious threat to Ghana and its citizens, 
even though the country has found itself in an unstable region, this research seeks to 
examine the significant roles of the state and non-state actors in countering the peril 
of HGT in Ghana, and the challenges involved. There were reports that some 
Ghanaians returned home after gaining experience from fighting abroad with terrorist 
organizations and this may pose risks to the emergence and spread of HGT in Ghana. 
There is also the threat of Islamic radicalism in Ghana and the threat posed by ISIS 
regarding their recruitment of some Ghanaian Muslim youth. 
This Chapter seeks to elaborate on the above issues and their relations to 
HGT. Studying HGT in Ghana is even more urgent and imperative given the events 
in other West African countries, and considering its unique democratic achievements 
and the fact that it has not yet experienced any domestic or international terrorism 
attack. 
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1.1 Ghana and HGT Threat 
 
 
Ghana in earlier times, known as Gold Coast is a country on the west coast of 
Africa. It is bordered by Ivory Coast in the west, Togo in the East, Burkina Faso in 
the north, and the Atlantic Ocean in the south. In 1992, Ghana moved into a 
transition of multi-party democracy and became the most secured nation in the sub- 
region and Africa as a whole (BBC country profile, 2017). 
 
After its move to multi-party democratic system in 1992; Ghana has 
completed a key tread towards amalgamating its self-governing accomplishments. 
Not like many African nations, Ghana has witnessed seven gratis and flaxen voting 
in 25 years and three nonviolent transition of power, which makes the nation more 
stable and solid in achieving developments. 
 
Globally, Ghana has gained positive recognition, as it ranks 26th in the 2016 
World Press Freedom Index and 2nd in Africa. The Index measures the pluralism, 
liberty and independence of the media, excellence of lawmaking structure and 
protection of members of the press in each of the 180 nations in the grading. Ghana's 
governance has also seen vital development through the strengthening of its self- 
governing testimonial. There are now 24 recognized political parties in Ghana 
(Electoral Commission, 2016). 
 
According to Hirsch (2013), Ghana has surfaced, by assessment to its 
neighboring countries, as one of the very few nations where voting are supervised 
smoothly, and where ballot vote disagreement are determined by judges, not armed 
groups, while the political situation is dominated by two biggest parties, New 
Patriotic Party and National Democratic Congress. The greatest conventional 
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democratic system in Africa has been experienced in Ghana. The nation also has a 
strong wisdom of national character and harmony that replace other connection such 
as customs and clan, arising out of a learning system in which people from diverse 
environments apt to merge (Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, 2017). 
 
Over the past years, Ghana has been touted as an oasis of peace and stability 
in a rather volatile and conflict-prone West African sub-region. Whereas many of its 
neighboring countries have descended into deadly civil wars and conflicts, Ghana  
has been able to maintain relative cohesion and stability, even though there have 
been many pockets of communal conflicts and disturbances in one part of the country 
or another. As a country and regardless of its various differences, including tribal, 
religious and political, Ghana has always co-existed peacefully. 
 
Ghana seems to have avoided all the pitfalls and traps which tend to trigger 
such deadly conflicts in neighboring countries. It is against this background that the 
growing and almost entrenched impression which is created particularly during 
electoral cycles that the country is some sort of a war zone and in urgent need of 
peace-promotion measures should be worrying. 
 
However, Ghana cannot be complacent with a false sense of peace and 
stability. Yet by the same token it needs to guard against the potential of a few self- 
seeking individuals or group of individuals taking advantage of developments 
elsewhere to create this climate of fear, particularly during the count-down to 
elections (Nyamenna, 2012). 
 
In terms of its natural and human resources, Ghana is favorably endowed 
country. Since the colonial period Ghana has depended largely on Coaco production, 
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the extraction of minerals like gold, diamond manganese, forest production like 
timber and bauxite and discovered oil in 2007. Over the years, Ghana’s economy 
grew because the country had accumulated enough resources from earnings on its 
export trade and investment including roads, railways, the ports and communication 
(Asante, 2011). 
The system of governance in Ghana operates with the office of the President, 
who is both head of state and head of administration, and of a multi-party system, 
also those elected or appointed to serve in high offices as its nerve-centre. The 
leadership participates in the determination of the most important policies but the 
power of the president is extensive. Flag Staff house/Jubilee house is the seat of 
government and the administrative power is worked out by the government, while 
the lawmaking command is vested in both the administration and parliament, with 
the courts being independent of the decision-making and the legislature. 
Ghana is like any other African country is full of diverse ethnic groups, tribes 
and religious beliefs. In spite the diverse nature of Ghanaians, they share common 
values that weld their various faith, ideologies, culture and tribes together as one 
people. Even though, time has proven that the values of Ghana as a nation and as 
individuals are not static but keep evolving. 
 
The Constitution of Ghana includes a structure of verification and balances, 
with supremacy shared between a president, a unicameral parliament, a council of 
state, and an independent judiciary (Asante, 2011). Enshrined in the constitution, is 
article 12 (2) that reads, Every person in Ghana, whatever his race, place of origin, 
political opinion, colour, religion, creed or gender shall be entitled to the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual contained in this Chapter 
but subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest 
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(Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1993). This article provides citizens of 
Ghana the right to practice any religion of their choice, though in a way that does not 
infringe on the rights of non-practitioners of any religion. 
 
The religion of Islam is practiced extensively and widely in Ghana. Its 
existence in contemporary Ghana dates back to the 10th Century which corresponds 
with the end of the old Ghana Empire. Historically, Islam preceded Christianity in 
Ghana. According to Azumah (2000), Muslims came to modern Ghana in the 14th 
Century, mostly from the north. Muslim religious scholars generally identified to as 
“Malams”, influenced a few northern local rulers, principally through the 
performance of sooth-saying and the delivering of trinkets and talisman for medicinal 
and war intentions (Bari, 2014). 
 
A few aggressive campaigns were carried out by slave-raiding Muslim 
factions in the late 19th Century in Salaga of the northern region. These operations 
only thrived in building the affected ethnic groups’ reluctance to Islam. Traders from 
Nigeria and other neighboring countries brought Islam into touch with the Ashanti 
Kingdom in the late 18th Century. But in Gt. Accra and Central Regions, Islam was 
first felt in the 1830s through migration of the freed slaves from the East Indies  
(Bari, 2013). 
 
Yet, in the last four decades, there has been a significant increase in Muslim 
activity in Ghana, resulting in a proliferation of Islamic organizations. In 1971, a 
Muslim missionary organization known as the Islamic Reformation and Research 
Centre was started in Accra. Activists of the Center refer to it as Ahlul Sunnah Wal 
Jamaa’  disciple  regulations,  the  association  is  fund  by  the  Dar  al-Ifta  الافتءا   راد  of 
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Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries and has since created thousands of followers who 
have been to universities in Arab countries for additional studies (Bari, 2014). 
 
The population of Muslims in Ghana is about 18% to 30% (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2012). Despite religious tensions in some West African countries since the 
mid-1970s, Muslims and Christians in Ghana have had brilliant relationships. Their 
pleasant affairs are steered by the influence of the Muslim and Christian 
commissioners and leaders’ councils. Most of these religious tensions experienced by 
some other countries in West Africa especially the northern part of Nigeria have 
escalated into terrorist’s attacks that are mainly home-grown. 
 
HGT is considered as a major threat to the safety and security of countries 
around the world and in Africa; Ghana is no exception. Generally, Africa is alleged 
to be a focal point of HGT based on known situations and circumstances such as war, 
poverty ailment, bad governance and corruption (Sosuh, 2011). Based on those 
conditions, it is very intricate to discover what comprises HGT as a lot of the efforts 
by the individuals in quest of their recognized nationwide root and freedom were 
ended through violent means. 
 
According to Muhlhausen and McNeill (2011), between 1969 and 2009, there 
were 38,345 terrorist events around the world. Out of the aforementioned attacks, 7.8 
percent were against the United States, while 92.2 percent were against the rest of the 
world. United States’ country reports indicated that, Africa has witnessed 
considerable stages of HGT action in 2015 and 2016 (U.S Department of States, 
2015). While home-grown terror attacks in the developed world surge 650% in one 
year, the total people deceased by the terror attacks in 2015 in Africa is as much, if 
not bigger than the deaths meted out by ISIS in the Middle East (Gaouette, 2016). 
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This calls for concern and the implementation of certain initiatives geared 
towards preventing HGT. Islam as a religion forbids acts of violence, but some of its 
followers are deemed to be perpetuators of HGT. 
 
In the European concern; France, Belgium, Turkey, Britain have been striving 
to curb this menace. The case in Africa is not different as countries like Kenya, 
Nigeria, Somalia, Mali and some other countries all find themselves in this same 
struggle. This calls for a serious attention from the state and non-state actors to work 
hard and ensure the safety of their citizens. 
 
Even though Ghana has not experienced any form of terrorism like its 
counterpart in the African sub-region, lessons learnt from the devastating relics of 
HGT in these countries, raises eye-brows on the need for state and non-state actors to 
take concrete steps in avoiding HGT from rearing its ugly head in the nation. 
 
However, one may assume that, the state and non-state actors in Ghana have 
not done enough to prevent HGT. But in Mathew (2013) thesis, he hypothesized that, 
Ghana is not adequately prepared in terms of policies and counter-terrorism strategy 
to prevent terrorism from occurring or to battle it if it crops up. Therefore, he 
suggested many policies and mechanisms that can be put in place to prevent 
terrorism. 
Accepting this fact, Anim (2015) quoted a high ranking administrator of the 
Ghana Customs Service, who pointed out that, actions and tricks of Boko Haram 
intimidate the safety of the region and the world at large. The customs officer 
explained that among other things that, once HGT has occurred in Nigeria; it is only 
a matter of time before it happens in Ghana. He argued that Ghana and Nigeria are 
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Anglophone nations occupied by the British; with similar social structures. This is a 
clear affirmation of how vulnerable Ghana is with regards to the threat of HGT. 
In Obour’s (2016) report, he wrote that, in the first quarter of 2016 the 
Ghanaian Chronicle Newspaper reported the vigilance of the law enforcement 
agencies, in reaction to the implicit imminent terrorist attack on Ghana. The report 
further indicated the measures taken by the state as, police officers disguised as 
supporting staff, made their attendance amiably felt at various locations of public 
crowd, mainly hotels and malls. This development was followed by Prophet TB 
Joshua's prophesy that, Ghana was about to witness its first terrorist attack. The 
attack, he said, could occur either on Thursday, Friday or Saturday of April 2016. 
Also, according to a Voice of America’s news reporter Forson (2016), a 
leaked memorandum hinted the threat of a terror attack in Ghana is real, quoting 
intelligence from the Ghana National Security Council Secretariat. The memo was 
addressed to Ghana’s immigration service to put stronger border surveillance, 
including thorough profiling of people coming to Ghana from Mali, Niger and Libya. 
This development called the then president of Ghana his Excellency John Dramani 
Mahama (2012-2017) to address the nation and explain the measures taken by the 
government to curtail that threat. 
In the president’s address, he assured Ghanaians of their safety while saying 
that: “we have trained our own special forces. Currently, a significant number of 
them are on standby. We are preparing for any such [eventuality] but we need the 
alertness of the public” (The Chronicle Newspaper, 2016). By this assertion, it 
appears that the national security was prepared for any ultimate terrorist attack by 
positioning its men at very vantage points around the country. 
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But there are more issues of concern regarding HGT threat in Ghana. As  
there are factors that could cause HGT in Ghana if not properly addressed. These 
include; several Ghanaians in Libya who went in search of jobs and Tornyi (2015) 
reported that ISIS militant group kidnapped a Ghanaian Christian and two other 
Africans in eastern Libya in 2015. In September 2017, the current United Nations 
recognized Libyan administration declared that it has recognized at least 50 forefront 
fighters of ISIS to be Ghanaians. 
This was enclosed in a statement from an enquiry into crimes committed in 
cities across Libya by the so-called Islamic State released by the Head of 
Investigations at the Office of the Attorney General, Al-Seddiq al-Sour (Citi Fm 
Online, Tuesday, October 10, 2017). Such situations can make Ghanaians who return 
home, after ISIS captured some of the cities in Libya, culpable and capable of 
igniting the flame of HGT as witnessed in many countries. 
According to Jaiprgas (2016), there is increasing alarming issues among 
regional counterterrorism executives that the United States-backed fight mechanism 
surrounding ISIS is fortuitously producing an extremist alumni system in Southeast 
Asia and some other places; made up of escaped rebellious looking for a safe refuge 
in their home nations. This is because the threats posed by the foreign terrorist fighter 
returnees are real and looming. 
However, the United Nations Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee 
(UNCTC) during Head of States meeting in 2014 defined foreign terrorist fighters as 
persons who go to a nation other than their country of habitation or nationality for the 
reason of committing, setting up or training, or involving in terrorist actions or 
providing or taking part of terrorist training, as well as in linking with fortified 
conflict. 
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According to the Security Council, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic 
States and related factions have recruited more than 30,000 strange radical fighters 
from over 100 associate nations. The related challenges are international in nature 
(UN Security Council, 2014). 
Yet, the alarming case of these foreign fighters for Ghana seems to be very 
perilous, as the state has no data and vivid information on the actual number of youth 
who had traveled to those areas. These returnees may clearly have momentous 
influence and may proven to be able to organize or simply inspire attacks back at 
their home countries. A situation that may compel Islamic State IS to demand far 
more attacks from its members and loyalists as it suffers on the battlefield in so many 
places they used to control in Iraq, Syria and Libya. 
Nevertheless, in Ghana, there seem to be too little focus on ISIS threats 
emanating from Western countries; especially by the state actors. Discussing ISIS 
threat through media houses would never help curb their advancement towards the 
country; rather, it will furnish them with more information to re-strategize their 
approach towards Ghanaian Muslims. 
Therefore, there is the need for the state and non-state actors to be certain 
that, Ghanaians would work together to avert terrorism of all types, but should not 
act blindly, rather must work harder towards a better understanding of the problem 
and build good protective counter strategies. Equipped with such awareness, the state 
and non-state actors will be better positioned to develop strategies to prevent 
religious radicalization that may lead to HGT tragic killings (Willis, 2017). 
According to Control Risks Report (2016), religious radicalization has made 
roads into Ghana, Senegal and Ivory Coast, but remains more limited in Mali, 
Nigeria and Niger. Ghana and Ivory Coast in particular have seen their Muslim 
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population grow significantly over the past 30 to 40 years, following influence of 
immigration from Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Guinea. The 
associated importation from threads of Islam has fine-tuned tensions between 
moderate and more hardliner sections of the population and had contributed to the 
emergence of radical sects, particular in parts of the north, Ashanti Region and the 
capital Greater Accra. 
Youth unemployment and the weakening of traditional social structures have 
also allowed radical Muslims to take root in Ghana and Senegal. According to Aning 
and Abdallah (2013), Ghana’s religious radicalization can be best described as 
adopting or spreading fussy thread or strands of a particular religious’ values, beliefs 
or thought by some Muslim religious groups which are divergent to views and ideas 
held by other Muslim and non-Muslim groups. 
King and Taylor (2011) consider that, radicalization as a practice is not by 
nuance specific to any rigorous state, religious or political group. But, the term 
radicalization in its existing figure is often used to illustrate an incident that leads to 
HGT. The current situation of Muslims around the world today faces a huge number 
of challenges regarding the fight against extremism and terrorism; Muslims in Ghana 
are no exception considering the number of Ghanaian Muslim youth who recently 
flocked to join ISIS and other terrorist groups (Mohammed-Awall, 2015). 
Nothing disturbs the mind more than the expression of apparently seeing a 
Ghanaian Muslim addressing the world as he viciously beheads a fellow human 
being. But while the number of violent and extremists Ghanaians are relatively small, 
the issues underlying their reasons for joining terrorist groups are wide spread. One 
main issue that can be the cause of extremism and terrorism among Ghanaian 
Muslims is religious radicalization (Hirsch, 2014). 
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Yet, the role of religion in causing radicalization among Ghanaian Muslims is 
debatable. Aly (2015) believes that religion plays less role in causing radicalization, 
because there is no empirical evidence to support such claim. Patterson (2015) has 
attributed the cause of religious radicalization among Muslims to four  main 
concerns. These causes have served to deepen Ghana’s vulnerability to 
radicalization: organizational and traditional issues, grumbles, foreign policy of super 
powers, and radical ideology. 
Aning and Abdallah (2013) also affirmed that, through financial support from 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Morocco, Algeria, and some other Islamic countries, Ghanaian 
Muslims have developed a radical nature of defending their ideology. In  Ghana, 
there are four main Muslim sects classified as follows: 
i. Tariqatul Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya of the Sufis groups in Ghana; these 
particular groups are presently known in Ghana as the Tijaniyya Movement 
under the leadership of Zaeemul Haraka Shaikh Abdul Wadud Sisse who has 
been praised by his followers for transforming this faction through 
developmental programs. 
ii. Qadiyaniya or Ahamadiya faction is a movement led by Alhaji Maulvi 
Mohammed Bin Salih. 
iii. Ahlussunna Waljama’a led by Sheikh Umar Ibrahim Imam. According to 
Aning & Abdallah (2013), this is a group that has been specifically regarded 
by their rival groups in Ghana as Wahabis. It is from this sect that Salafis and 
Jamat Tabligh emerged in Ghana. 
iv. The Shiites or Shias are also represented in Ghana, but with very few 
followers. 
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In the present Ghanaian situation, there is a group that emerged from Ahlul 
Sunnah. This group is identified as Salafis; some Ghanaian Muslim scholars 
classified this group as a radical religious group for the reason of their search for 
modification and return to the times of yore, the Qur’an and Hadith. The quest for 
this modification replicates in their ideas, doctrines and advocating approach. 
Salafis apparent essential thoughts at times lead to violent behavior. 
Nevertheless, exercising violence is not constrained to this group alone in Ghana. 
Their equal factions, Tijaniyya and Shia have also been well-known to commit 
violence as a reaction or response to supposed and definite assaults by the 
Ahlussunna faction. Yet, the Ahmadis association also engaged in aggression and 
violent behavior with the conventional Tijaniyya Muslim in the 1930s and 1940s 
when the belief was being launched in Ghana. 
At the moment, Ahmadis are perceived by many non-Muslim Ghanaians to be 
modest Muslims because of their focus on attracting persons and increasing their fizz 
of persuasion in the course of developing projects rather than fierce extremism. 
As for Jama’at Tabligh, غيلبتلا و ةوعدلا ةعامج they fundamentally connect to preaching and 
spreading the message of Islam in mosques throughout the country. Consequently, 
this group of Ahlul Sunnah is not linked to violent radicalization in Ghana (Aning & 
Abdallah, 2013). 
This confirms that the violent nature of Ghanaian Muslims is not targeted at 
the state, but if not checked well, it could undermine the peace and stability that the 
country enjoys and lead to HGT once ISIS transmit their ideology to the Muslim 
youth in Ghana. 
Even so, the Islamic State (IS) is a threat in Ghana as indicated by the Ghana 
National Security. In the middle of 2015, Ghana grappled with a report suggesting 
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that a fresh Ghanaian Muslim under-graduate (Nazir Alema) and his colleague joined 
the Islamic State, the most dangerous terrorist group in the world. It was a report that 
caused fear and panic among Ghanaian citizens, both Muslims and Christians 
(Shaban 2016). 
According to Mullen's (2015) analysis, ISIS appeals to young Muslims by 
religious idealism to escape the frustration some of them may be going through due 
to the difficult life in Africa for recruitment. However, it is established that ISIS has 
recruitment agencies in so many countries around the world. 
These recruiters preach to the youth the luxury life they will be enjoying after 
being killed in a battle field while fighting against unbelievers. As an extremist, the 
person will feel that is the best opportunity for him to take advantage and be part of 
the group. The recruiters also may quote some Quranic verses and interpret them 
wrongly to convince the youth to join the organization. 
In the first quarter of 2016, the government of Ghana estimated that an 
unspecific number of Ghanaian Muslims joined ISIS to fight in Syria, Libya and Iraq 
(Citi FM Online, 2015). In 2017, according to Daily Graphic Online Report (04-05- 
2017), a 21-year-old from northern Ghana was in 2016 prevented from being 
recruited by the Islamic State’s agencies in Ghana, through the effort of the Senior 
Manager of the West Africa Centre for Counter-Extremism (WACCE), Mr Mutaru 
Mumuni Muqthar. 
The senior manager explained that, his association (WACCE), ever since its 
founding in 2013, has being able to prevent about twenty Ghanaians from being 
recruited by extremist groups. What is more alarming now is not about the number of 
those who joined ISIS, but the type of personalities involved. These are not just 
ordinary citizens but students at their tertiary levels of education. Who knows, may 
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be some Muslim lecturers, civil servants and even security personnel may also be 
involved. 
Ghana’s National Security Council (NSC) in 2016 disclosed that, the country 
faces a credible terrorist threat following Ivory Coast’s attack (Shaban 2016). This 
reportage made the president John Dramani Mahama (2012-2017) who was also the 
head of National Security Council, called an emergency meeting at which the 
security situation in the country was reviewed. Prior to this news, what many 
Ghanaians thought was far has started knocking on their doors. 
The above discussion indicates that, there seem to be real threats of HGT in 
Ghana that must be taken very seriously. The state and non state actors cannot wait 
for terrorist-righteous anger to occur before they put in place necessary measures to 
counter the possibility of its occurrence. Therefore, in line with this study, it is 
necessary to subsequently discuss the roles of the state and non-state actors in 
preventing HGT and strategies of countering HGT in Ghana. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
HGT is a relatively new security challenge in West Africa. Al Qaeda, Boko 
Haram and Islamic State militants have challenged the sovereignties of nations and 
contributed to instability of West Africa. These groups have assumed a militant form 
in the region, thus recruiting youth and engaging them in HGT acts. The 
phenomenon has made many policy makers and security experts in West Africa to 
describe the region as a hot spot of rising home-grown terrorist actions. 
The bloody siege in Mali, Niger, Cameroun, Chad, Burkina Faso and Ivory 
Coast underline the evolution of brutal activities of Boko Haram, Islamic State and 
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Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) beyond their traditional theatre of conflict in 
Nigeria, Iraq, Yemen, France, Belgium, Turkey, Egypt and Syria. 
The most dreadful issue actually, is the rising persuasion of the radical groups 
in the midst of educated Ghanaian Muslim youth. There was a report that links some 
well educated Ghanaian Muslims with Islamic State in the year 2015 (Citi FM 
Online, August 28 2015). Hence, the ideological influence of ISIS on the Ghanaian 
Muslim youth is quite alarming and noticeable. 
The fortitude of HGT and the increase of sadistic radical groups in the West 
African region underscore the confines of straight approaches to battle them. Several 
years of skills have established that unskilled approaches and a solitary intelligence 
focused on security actions are not enough in the global battle against HGT. 
The recent recruitment of Ghanaian Muslims to ISIS is thus far one more indication 
of the serious danger Islamic State, AQIM and Boko Haram pose to the West African 
region and the world at large, particularly to Ghana and countries with minority 
Muslims. 
This recruitment diary suggest that if care is not taken, Ghana as a country 
can be targeted by the Islamic State, Boko Haram or AQIM inspired terrorist attacks 
from its citizens or individuals outside the country. 
The above factors indicate that, in Ghana’s case, HGT threat exists. But why has 
Ghana not yet experienced any incidence of HGT and what have the state and non 
state actors did to prevent it, what are the counter-terrorism strategies adopted by 
both actors? 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of this research are to: 
 
i. Identify the nature of HGT threat in Ghana 
 
ii. Assess the impact of the roles played by the state and non-state actors in 
countering HGT in Ghana 
iii. Analyze the challenges of preventing HGT in Ghana by the state and non- 
state actors 
 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
The research questions of this research are: 
 
i. What is the nature of HGT in Ghana? 
 
ii. How did the state and non-state actors prevent HGT in Ghana? 
 
iii. Why is it important for the state and non-state actors to overcome the 
challenges of preventing HGT? And what are the challenges? 
 
 
 
1.5 Aim of the Study 
 
 
The main aim of this study is to address issues of preventing HGT and the 
challenges involved. The study will serve as a platform for other studies on 
preventing Ghanaian Muslims from religious extremism that may lead to HGT. It is 
hoped that the information that would be generated from this research will serve as a 
tool for the government of Ghana, academia, researchers in general and Muslim 
religious groups. Researchers can use this study to look at preventing Muslim youth 
from HGT, and critically analyze its effect on Muslim youth around the West 
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African region. This study will also afford the international community an 
opportunity to critically evaluate their international relations strategy. 
 
 
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
This study focused on how the state and non-state actors countered HGT in 
Ghana and the challenges they faced from the period of 2015 to 2017. This is 
because the regional block of West Africa is endangered by HGT from the activities 
of radical Muslims and terrorist groups. 
Ghana is taken as a case study in West Africa due to the enormous size of the 
West African region. Moreover, Ghana occupies a strategic location in West Africa 
and shares boarders with three (3) different countries with similar socioeconomic and 
political characteristics. The importance of choosing Ghana also results from the 
attention it has attracted from both regional and international communities. 
The scope of this study is limited to opinion leaders and institutions that have 
the responsibilities of countering HGT in Ghana in relation to the roles of state and 
non-state actors. Non-state actors are restricted to Imams in Ghana, while state actors 
are limited to members of the Ghanaian Armed Forces, Ghana Police Service and 
National Security Council (NSC). 
The study also focused on the origin and nature of HGT in Ghana; the threats 
of Islamic radicalism that terrorist groups like ISIS pose to the security of Ghana and 
the challenges of preventing their acts of terrorism. 
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1.7 Definition of Concepts 
 
 
State: This is a protective entity guarded by a government and occupied by 
inhabitants. States play major roles in ensuring security, stability or causing conflict. 
Non-state Actors: are structured factions that have an ordered structure, functioning 
outside state by means of forces to attain political ambitions or making an alleged 
political approach. Non-state actors may work with the state to achieve development 
or work against it to cause conflict. 
Radicalization: is a practice by which a person or faction adopts excessive political, 
social, or religious principles and desires that refuse or demoralize the character or 
challenge modern ideas and expressions of liberty of choice. 
Extremism: This is confidence and hold up of ideas that are extremely far from what 
most individuals regard as acceptable or sensible. 
Imam in Ghana: Imams in Ghana are those who lead Islamic prayers and provide 
moral services to Muslim communities and also contribute to enhance living 
conditions through providing neighbourhood supports and aid. One of the main tasks 
of Imams is providing religious counsel to young Muslims who plan to wed. 
Notwithstanding that Imams are carefully selected at the community, district 
municipal and regional levels. Muslims in a community decide and accept a 
responsible individual who is measured, educated, knowledgeable and astute. 
 
 
 
1.8 Research Methodology 
 
This section explains the chosen methods of information gathering and 
investigation procedures. Specifically, it touches on the research design, population, 
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sample, data collection instrument and procedure, data analysis and the whole 
research procedure. 
 
 
1.8.1 Research plan 
 
It is noticeable that the research topic from the literature review is very 
complex particularly because it deals with HGT as a threat to human security in 
Ghana and strategy of countering terrorism. 
This demonstrated that a qualitative research method would be more suitable 
than a quantitative research method. Qualitative data presents an affluent detailed 
depiction to be constructed regarding why and how individuals act in certain habits, 
and their move towards those actions. Qualitative facts do not only count things, but 
it is a way of recording individual’s feelings, thoughts and activities in better 
deepness (Liamputtong, 2013). 
The recompense of qualitative research is that, it enables the researcher to 
find out the “why” behind some conducts; this is because instead of investigating 
figures, the researcher uses language and behavior. An additional benefit of 
qualitative research is that, there is an immense compact of elasticity involved. 
Some examples of qualitative research approaches include focus group 
discussions (FGDs), interpersonal interviews, or ethnography, which is a means to 
represent graphically and in writing, the nature of a certain culture of people. 
Recently, other examples of qualitative research have emerged like: online focus 
groups, bulletin boards, and short message services (SMS) to explore a population 
that is advanced in technology. 
Based on the above factors, a qualitative research method employed for this 
study to find out the nature of HGT threat in Ghana, how successful were the state 
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and non-state actors in Ghana to counter HGT and the potential challenges they faced 
in executing those tasks in all the ten regions across Ghana (Gt. Accra, Ashanti, 
Northern, Central, Western, Eastern, Brong Ahafo, Upper West, Upper East, and Volta 
region). 
The questions to this pragmatic research were responded to using qualitative 
data that become visible from auto taped individual in-depth interview, explanations 
and transcriptions. 
 
 
1.8.2 Population 
 
A research population is more often than not an outsized group of persons or 
materials that is the core focal point of a systematic examination. It is for the benefit 
of the population that researches are completed. Yet, for the reason that the large 
sizes of populations, scholars frequently cannot assess every person in the population 
since it is too luxurious and time-consuming. 
This is the reason why scholars rely on sampling methods. A research 
population is also known as a precise gathering of individuals or objects identified to 
have related uniqueness. All persons or materials within a certain population usually 
have an ordinary, requisite feature or characteristic. Frequently, the depiction of the 
population and the ordinary required feature of its components are equal (Shenk and 
Westerhaus, 1991). 
However, taking into consideration the focus of this study and the broad- 
based nature of Muslims in Ghana, the target population for this study regarding non- 
state actors is all Imams in all the ten regions in Ghana. The actual estimated 
population would be very difficult to assert, but can be projected to be between three 
hundred thousand (300,000) to six hundred thousand (600,000) (Office of the 
